SOME REMARKS ON THE ROYAL NAVY.

To which are annexed ſome Short but Intereſting

REFLECTIONS ON A FUTURE PEACE.

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SOME FURTHER REMARKS ON NAVAL AFFAIRS.

THAT there never was any ſublunary Syſtem ſo abſolutely compleat as to be quite ſuperior to any further Improvement, is a Maxim univerſally allowed. And that even that Degree of Perfection which diſtinguiſhes and adorns the moſt perfect, has been entirely founded on Experience and Obſervation, which Time alone has enabled Men to make, and conſequently is not the Plan of one, but of

many, is as little to be denied. There are, notwithſtanding, who are ſo very tenacious of antient Practice, that, like Children, they are afraid of treading out of the Steps of thoſe who went before them, as if nothing could be good that was not derived to them from their Predeceſſors, than which Opinion nothing can be of more dangerous Conſequence to a State, inaſmuch as it tends to blaſt in the very Bud every Kind of Improvement. On the other hand, there are thoſe who will not admit any Alteration in any of the preſent Syſtems, thro' a Perſuaſion of ſuch Amendment carrying with it a Reflexion on Government. But give me leave to aſk thoſe Gentlemen, if it is not a much ſeverer Reproach to thoſe in Power through a falſe Pride to continue in a manifeſtly wrong Method, than to change it for a better, if a better chance to offer itſelf to them. For what would that be other than perſevering in the Wrong meerly for Wrong's ſake. Good, let it ſpring from what Quarter it will, ought always to be well

well received; nor can there be a greater Folly than to deſpiſe it, becauſe it happens not to be authoriſed by the State; for no State can make Right Wrong, or Wrong Right. But let this be as it will, I ſhall once more venture to throw out my Thoughts on a favourite Object of the Public, and which I hope to God will always continue a favourite Object, I mean our Fleet, which, tho' it has been already as well plann'd and as wiſely conſider'd in this, as, perhaps, in moſt Countries, is ſtill wanting in my Opinion of Perfection in many Particulars: And here, not to mix our Private Ships of War with our Men of War, I ſhall begin with ſome Conſiderations on the preſent Manner of granting Letters of Marque, which being given to People of little or no Character, is often the Cauſe of Piracies and other Diſorders committed on the high Seas. I am ſorry to ſay on this Occaſion that the Abuſes which have been of late made of thoſe Commiſſions, have caſt ſuch an indelible

Stain

Stain on the Credit of this Country as will be hard to wipe out: For what greater Diſhonour can befall a State, than to be look'd upon by all her Neighbours as a Neſt of Pirates. Many of theſe Robberies I am willing to beleive have been committed by *French* and *Dutch* acting under *Engliſh* Colours, and many others which have been reported I make no Doubt have been entirely without Foundation. In the mean time I heartily wiſh I could ſay in behalf of my Countrymen that they have been entirely innocent: For, good Gods! what honeſt *Engliſhman* muſt not bluſh to hear that no Inſurances are to be made at home or abroad on any neutral Merchant Veſſels traverſing the High Seas, without excepting *Engliſh* Piracies? Is it poſſible to think that ſuch outrageous Behaviour will not in the End ſtir up and unite all *Europe* againſt us? I don't mean hereby that we ſhould be in the leaſt afraid of ſeizing ſuch Property of the Enemy's as is liable to Capture found aboard neutral Ships; for I can never be

of

of Opinion that free Ships make free Goods: And the Treaty itſelf of 1674 allows of it only in particular Caſes, for by the 2d Article that Liberty is confined to ſuch Commodities as were uſually carried in Time of Peace: The Words are, "as ſhall be carried in Time of Peace," which have Reference only to the Time of either of the Parties to the Treaty being engaged in War, *viz.* that the neutral Power ſhall have free Liberty to carry all ſuch Goods during the War as it was cuſtomary for her Subjects to carry before the War broke out: For otherwiſe they would have extended free Navigation to all Commodities whatſoever which they ſhall at any Time carry without thoſe Words of Reſtriction in Time of Peace; but in the preſent Caſe it is evident that the Words "ſhall be carried," means no more than from the Time of making the Treaty, to the Time of either of the Parties to the Treaty entering into a War with a third Power. What Right then can this give our Neighbours of carrying

rying our Enemy's Colony Goods where they were never ſuffer'd to trade before the Commencement of the War? Nay, I am of Opinion that *French* Property *, carried in *Dutch* Ships from Port to Port in *Old France*, is liable to Capture, as it could not be worth their while to uſe that Trade in Time of Peace, ſubject to the Fret of 50 Sous *per* Ton, which the Treaty of *Utrecht* doth not exempt them from, however free they may be in other Caſes of the Ports of *Old France*. And, indeed, every body muſt allow that there is a material Diſtinction to be made between a Liberty, *bona Fide*, freely granted by one Power to another Power in time of a general Peace of carrying their Merchandize for them, and the meer Indulgence of it to any neutral Power during a Time of War, only in order

* *Note*, In all Caſes where the Carriage of *French* Goods, being *French* Property, has been either diſuſed through heavy Duties, or have never before been enjoyed by our Allies, it is apparent that ſuch Goods were never intended to be freed by the Treaty.

order to cover and preſerve their Property from falling into the Enemy's Hands, the taking Advantage of which, is a downright Evaſion of the Treaty, which can never be ſuffer'd. And though the Treaty ſays, that provided they have no contraband Goods aboard which are declared in the ſaid Treaty, they ſhall freely paſs on producing their Sea-Briefs; yet as nothing is more notorious than that Ships of neutral States make Uſe of Sham-Paſſports in order to impoſe on the Captains of the reſpective Powers at War, it is impoſſible to expect that an implicit Faith will be given to every Paſſport which ſhall be produced; and herein neutral Powers have no Cauſe to be diſſatisfied, as their Subjects have all the Security which can reaſonably be required in being intitled to a full Indemnification for any Loſſes which they ſhall incur by being illegally detain'd. This being the State of

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Note, The Words of the Treaty are as above quoted, "which they might have carried in Times of Peace." Might they then have carried *French* Colony Goods in Times of Peace?

the Treaty, I think we ought with Spirit to oppoſe any Evaſion of it. If indeed we are not in a Condition of helping ourſelves, well and good; we muſt then ſubmit to the worſt; but if we are not yet ſo low reduced but that we are ſtill able to aſſert our Rights, we muſt be the meaneſt People under the Sun to be ſo far intimidated by the Preparations of our Allies as tamely to ſuffer them, without Oppoſition, to aſſiſt our Enemy in bringing home their Merchandize for them which they dare not bring home themſelves: For what would ſuch a Ceſſion be in effect than granting the Enemy herſelf a Security for her Trade? For as to the Expence of hiring *Dutch* Ships, what is it in compariſon of the preſent heavy Inſurances of Goods, and the dangerous Riſques they muſt otherwiſe run at Sea? And if we can't take the Enemy's Goods found in neutral Bottoms, we can't take them at all. Beſides, it enables the Enemy to furniſh her Ships of War with a greater Number of Sailors and to carry on the War much longer than otherwiſe ſhe would be

able

able to do, in which Reſpect our Allies can't be ſaid to act as Allies: For what End can we hope to ſee put to the War if we ſuffer ourſelves to be deprived of the only Means which God has put into our Hands of reducing the Enemy to Reaſon, *viz.* that of capturing her Trade? But ſuch is the Good-will which our worthy Friends and Allies bear us, that they would, if they could, bind us Hand and Foot, and deliver us thus bound into the Hands of our Enemies. In a Word, I will venture to declare, that if this pretended Right is allow'd them, they can with Impunity do us much more Miſchief as Friends, than they could do our profeſſed Enemies. Healing Meaſures, nevertheleſs, are much and greatly to be wiſh'd; for Peace on any tolerable Terms is always far preferable to War; but in the mean time it highly concerns us to manifeſt an honourable Firmneſs and national Reſolution to abide by and ſupport our juſt Rights in Oppoſition to any Power who ſhall think fit to diſpute them with us; nor ſhould we, in my Opinion, part with

a ſingle Ship which we have already taken, till thoſe Rights have been fully ſettled and adjuſted on a proper Baſis. Under this Pretence, however, to paſs unnoticed our People's Plunder of neutral Goods on board neutral Ships, is contrary to the Faith of Nations, and the Laws both of God and Man. It highly behoves us therefore, not only in Regard to Juſtice, to put an immediate Stop to ſuch Proceedings, but ſound Policy itſelf; for by ſo doing, we ſhall have a greater Naval Force to employ againſt our inveterate Foe the *French*, in proportion as we ſhall have fewer Enemies to deal with, and withal ſhall gain a Reputation for Equity and Juſtice throughout all *Europe*: Beſides, by granting fewer Letters of Marque, there will of courſe be a better Supply of able-bodied Seamen to reinforce his Majeſty's Navy. An Attempt nevertheleſs of this Kind ought not to be undertaken without the greateſt Caution, leaſt by too ſevere Reſtrictions we ſhould too much repreſs the Ardour of Privatering, which is of undoubted Benefit to the State. All there-

therefore I would propoſe is, *1ſt*, That no Letters of Marque ſhould be granted to Veſſels of leſs than 100 Tons Burthen, Merchant Ships excepted. *2dly*, That every Privateer having made Capture of any Enemy's Ship, or any neutral Ship having any Enemy's Goods on board, ſhall be obliged to bring her into ſome of his Majeſty's Ports either at home or abroad, whole and entire, without taking out or embezling any Part of the Goods before the proper Officer has taken Cognizance of them. *3dly*, That no Privateer ſhall be allowed to have or carry on board any Peices of Bale Goods, except ſuch as is uſual, and may fairly be deem'd abſolutely neceſſary for the Ship's Uſe, and if any Peices of Bale Goods ſhall be found on board the ſaid Privateer (except ſuch as ſhall be judged neceſſary for the Ship's Uſe) the ſaid Veſſel and Cargo ſhall in that Caſe be liable to Seizure of any of his Majeſty's Cuſtom-Houſe Officers, or any other Perſon or Perſons, having firſt obtained a proper Warrant for that Purpoſe

of

of one of his Majeſty's Juſtices of the Peace, who ſhall be empower'd in ſuch Caſes to grant ſuch Warrants on proper Information received on Oath, and on legal Conviction the ſaid Ship and Goods ſhall become forfeited, and being ſold, one Half of the Profits ariſing from the Sale ſhall be appropriated to the Informer or Informers, or to his Majeſty's Cuſtom-Houſe Officer or Officers ſeizing the ſame, and Half to the Royal Cheſt at *Chatham*, for the Benefit of the poor Sailors, Penſioners of *Greenwich* Hoſpital. *4thly*, If any Commander of a private Ship of War ſhall be guilty of plundering any neutral Ship of neutral Goods, he ſhall, on legal Conviction, be liable to Felony, and his Men, as many of them as ſhall be apprehended, ſhall be obliged to ſerve on board his Majeſty's Fleet during the Remainder of the War without Wages, except in Caſes of his Men running away with the Ship, and by Force compelling their Commander to ſubmit, which ſometimes happens, and in

thoſe Caſes the Ringleaders only ſhall be liable to Felony, on legal Proof thereof, Information of ſuch Mutiny being made by the Commanding Officer within ſo many Days after his Arrival in ſome of his Majeſty's Ports, either at home or abroad, before ſome of his Majeſty's Juſtices of the Peace, or Governors, or their Deputies, or any others empower'd abroad with the Authority of Juſtices here; but if no ſuch Information ſhall be laid within ſo many Days, the Commander ſhall not after be allowed to avail himſelf of his Plea in Excuſe of himſelf. 5*thly*, If any two or more of the private Men of the ſaid Private Ship of War ſhall at any Time give Information of any Commanders having plunder'd any neutral Ship, they ſhall, on legal Conviction of the ſaid Commander, not only be entitled to his Majeſty's free Pardon, but ſhall alſo be entitled to receive one Third of the Profits of the ſaid Ship and Cargo, which ſhall be expoſed to Sale for that Purpoſe, and the Remainder ſhall be appropriated

priated to the Cheſt at *Chatham*. 6*thly*, Two or more *Guarda-Coſtas* ſhall be appointed to cruize in the narrow Seas, in order to protect neutral Ships, and to intercept any piratical Veſſels; and that they might not deviate from the true Intention for which they are thus ſtation'd, they ſhall not at any Time be entitled to any Benefit of Capture if any of the Enemy's Ships ſhould happen to fall into their Hands, but the Profits of the ſame ſhall on Condemnation be appropriated to the Cheſt at *Chatham*. And 7*thly*, Whereas on the Footing Things ſtand at preſent, there is no leſs Difficulty than Expence in bringing piratical Offenders to Juſtice, I ſee no Reaſon why ſuch Criminals ſhould not be tried as other Delinquents, by a Commiſſion of Oyer and Terminer, with this Difference only, that the Juries appointed to try ſuch Robberies ſhould conſiſt of Freeholders of 100 *l. per Annum* at leaſt. 8*thly*, For the eaſier apprehending and bringing to condign Puniſhment ſuch Offenders, every Juſtice of the Peace's Warrant

Warrant ſhould be made to extend equally to all Civil Caſes happening on the High Seas as well as at Land.

I SHALL now proceed to the Royal Navy; the Conduct and Management of which I can't think more deficient in any Particular, than that to this very Day we remain, thro' Want of proper Encouragement to our own People, unable to ſupply ourſelves with any ſufficient Quantity of Naval Stores, leaving it in the Power of Foreigners on any Emergency to diſtreſs us, than which, ſurely, there can't be a greater Folly. It may be urged, that the trucking of Goods with thoſe Powers who furniſh us with Naval Stores is an Advantage: But this, I am perſuaded, is a Miſtake, as the Importer and Exporter trade on their own Bottoms, without the leaſt Connection with one another; for they who buy Iron, Hemp or Flax, *&c.* purchaſe it with ready Money, and not by an Exchange of Goods. How greatly beneficial, therefore, would it not be

to us if we could find the Means of raiſing theſe Commodities, either in *Ireland*, or our *American* Colonies? For it would not only be poſſeſſing ourſelves of the Certainty of being provided with ſuch Neceſſaries, but even the Carriage of ſuch heavy Goods could not fail hereafter proving a uſeful Nurſery of Seamen, and may be the Means of preventing either of thoſe Countries from claſhing with us in ſeveral Branches of Trade, in which if they were to interfere, they may chance to be greatly detrimental to us. Preference of Merit, in the next Place, that Spur to great Actions, requires to be taken ſome Notice of, but deſerves a better Pen than mine to do it Juſtice; a juſt and quick Diſcernment of which is a Kind of Gift from Heaven, which few Men, and, in proportion, fewer Miniſters, though it is undoubtedly one of their firſt Requiſites, are endow'd with. For the Vain-glorious and Empty, who are by much the Majority under the Maſk of Virtue, are no leſs apt by their falſe Pretenſions to impoſe on others than themſelves: Nor have they any ſmall

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Advantage over the more deſerving, in that they dare attempt *aliquid Gyaris & Carcere Dignum.* With theſe Qualifications, aided with ſome Borough, or Parliamentary Intereſt, which, by the bye, is alone ſufficient to outweigh every Species of Virtue, they are always the firſt to ſollicit, and the firſt to obtain, all Places of the higheſt Honour and Profit; whilſt intrinſic Merit, conſcious of its own Worth, ſeldom Courts Preferment, expecting to be courted by it: Whatever other Men may do and ſubmit to, ſhe knows herſelf too well to miſpend her Time in paying a ſervile Attendance on any Man in order to obtain Favour; beſides, the Satisfaction ariſing from her own Virtue affords her ſuch happy and ſolid Contentment, that ſhe looks with Scorn on all public Rewards eſtabliſh'd on corrupt Principles. If therefore you would raiſe in the Government Men only of the greateſt Abilities and of the higheſt Honour, it behoves a Miniſter to enquire out ſuch, with the ſtricteſt Impartiality, among the moſt worthy, and not to hunt out

Places for the Sake of Men, but Men for Places. By theſe, and ſuch like Means as theſe, you'll inſpire all Ranks and Degrees of Men with a Spirit of Emulation, which ſpreading itſelf through every Part of Government, can't fail reflecting ſuch Divine Luſtre on its Sovereign, as will neceſſarily render him not only the Admiration of his Friends and Allies, but the juſt Terror of his Enemies: For who will care to enter the Liſt with a State having none but Men of Integrity and of the firſt Rate Parts to direct her Councils, and none but Men naturally brave, and of experienced Abilities to execute them? In ſhort, Genius improved by Learning and biaſs'd by Integrity, which I look upon to be the higheſt Degree of Merit, is the very Soul of Government: It is, as I have ſaid before, that *Promethean* Fire, the leaſt Particle of which can't be felt but it inſpires Life into every Part as far as its divine Rays extend themſelves; whilſt every other Species of Things out of the reach of

its divine Heat remains cold, lumpiſh, and inanimate, and totally incapable of producing any Act worthy of Admiration. Without this Genius to lead and conduct, 'tis in vain to ſend forth great Armies and Fleets, for this alone can grace the Hero's Brow with Laurel, which would ſoon wither and fade if gather'd by leſs ſacred Hands. Now by the preſent Inſtitutions and Rules of the Admiralty, I conceive it is impoſſible to employ any Man, however deſerving, or however well verſed in Naval Affairs, who has not firſt regularly ſerved a Kind of Apprenticeſhip on board his Majeſty's Fleet, nor even to advance thoſe who have thus qualified themſelves but according to Seniority, which ſeems to be not only an Abridgement of the Exerciſe of the Sovereign's Prerogative, but a great Denial to the Service: For if there ſhould be a Man, who by repeated Acts of unprecedented Gallantry and Behaviour has given indiſputable Proofs of his Proweſs and Courage, why ſhould not the Public avail

itſelf

itſelf of a Subject endow'd with ſuch uncommon Virtues by placing him in a Situation in which he may be of ſtill greater Service to his Country, without confining themſelves to the narrow Rules of ſerving a certain Time aboard his Majeſty's Fleet. Such Orders at firſt were, undoubtedly, well calculated in regard to the Excluſion of ſuch who were never regularly bred to the Sea, but ought not to bar Captains of Privateers, or ſuch who are perfectly ſkill'd in Navigation, if the Government ſhould at any time conceive ſo well of them as to think any of them deſerving of a Birth aboard the royal Navy. There is as little Reaſon to be urged againſt preferring or advancing any junior Officer of the Fleet (if any one in particular ſhould be found to be poſſeſſed with an extraordinary Share of Merit) to even the higheſt Rank in the Navy without Regard to Seniority, for otherwiſe Seniority muſt neceſſarily become a dead Weight on Merit, or the Public be ſhamefully ſaddled with an extraordinary Expence to maintain a

uſeleſs

uſeleſs Set of Men, who are profeſſedly, as it were, kick'd up Stairs with no other View but to be laid aſide as ſo much uſeleſs Lumber; a Practice which, however much in Uſe, is abſolutely as inconſiſtent with Juſtice and Prudence, as it is with national Oeconomy: For if they are to be looked upon as good Captains, though perhaps not in every Reſpect qualified as Commanding Admirals, why lay aſide ſuch a Number of good Officers to the great Prejudice of the Service? On the contrary, if they are Captains of an indifferent Character, why laviſh away the public Money by giving them the Rank and Pay of Admirals, which is ſo far from gaining them any Eſteem, that they are no ſooner made ſuch, but they immediately become the Bye-word of the People. Tried and experienced Virtue ought always to have the Preference of preſumptive Virtue, and a wiſe Government will always make Choice of the beſt in ſpite of Oppoſition, without being in the leaſt biaſs'd by the Intereſt

of

of Particulars, which in ſuch Caſes ought always to cede to the public Good: For it is a Rule which ſhould never be departed from, " that extraordinary Merit ſhould be always recompenced with extraordinary Rewards. Another Practice which I can't here eaſily paſs over, is the frequent Removals of Captains from one Ship to another, and preſſing Men from on board his Majeſty's Ships without any preſſing Neceſſity; for it is impoſſible at that rate that any Captain ſhould make himſelf acquainted with his Men, or his Men with him, which on many Occaſions is of infinite Conſequence; for Men will always exert much more Ardor and Spirit under one for whom they have conceived an Opinion and Affection, than under one who is in a manner an entire Stranger to them; of which we have many Inſtances in almoſt every Hiſtory both antient and modern. The *Romans* themſelves, who had ſubdued the *Volſcians* under the brave *Caius Marcius*, ceaſed to be the ſame People after they had

loſt

loſt him, inſomuch that they became even like one ſtruck with a Palſy, utterly incapable of lifting a Hand againſt the ſame *Volſcians* whom they had a little before conquer'd, when upon a Revolt, headed by their old baniſhed General, they made War even to the Gates of *Rome*: And again, *Cæſar*'s Men we know were never animated with the ſame Bravery under any other Commander as when he himſelf led them. But there are ſo many Examples of this Kind which muſt neceſſarily occur to every Man of reading, that to add more would be a Work of Supererogation. In the mean time it can't but be looked upon as a great Hardſhip on any Captain to be burthen'd with an extraordinary Expence on every Removal, or, perhaps, when that doth not happen, to be ſtripped at once of ſo many brave Tars, who, from the Opinion and Love they entertain'd of his high Valour and Clemency, freely engaged themſelves to run all the dangerous Hazards of the Sea with him. It is too no leſs hard upon

the Sailor who firſt offer'd his Service on a Perſuaſion of being under a particular Captain, which Conditions not being regarded, can't fail of making him and others more cautious another Time of voluntarily inliſting themſelves. In *Holland* I have heard, that Captains are not only obliged to victual, but to man their own Ships, which if they fail of doing, they loſe the Command; in which there ſeems to be this Policy, that they are ſure of employing no Captain who is not beloved by his Sailors; and I don't know but that it may be a right Maxim. I am, nevertheleſs, ſenſible that there are many Caſes where the turning Men over to other Ships may be abſolutely neceſſary, as when Ships are obliged to return home in order to refit, and there is no other Ship in Readineſs to receive the Crew; or on any great Emergency. All therefore that is intended by what has been ſaid, is to recommend it to thoſe who preſide over our Naval Affairs, that this Power, which it is neceſſary ſhould be left on their Hands, ſhould not be wantonly abuſed by frequently changing

changing Captains through Partiality, or for the Sake of Fees * only, which we apprehend has been too often practiſed. The Lives of the common Sailors is of ſo great Conſequence to the Nation, that I think any thing conducive thereto can never be ſufficiently conſider'd: The Severity of the Seaſons, the hard Labour they undergo, the different Climates they paſs through, and even the Dampneſs of the Element on which they live, expoſes them to many more Diſorders than are incident to other People; but, perhaps, nothing contributes more to their Want of Health than their Want of good Proviſions: The Salt Meat which they have, it is to be fear'd, is not always the beſt; many Peices, the Hogs not having been fatted as they ſhould have been, are often eat up and waſted by the Acrimony of the Salt, which not only leſſens the poor Sailors Meſs, but is apt to heighten the Scurvy amongſt them; whereas if the Hogs were to be fed on dry and hard

 Meat,

* *Quære*, If it is not reaſonable that Gentlemen of the Navy ſhould receive their Commiſſions exempt of Fees?

Meat, the Fleſh would be harder, firmer, and better able to reſiſt the Salt: it would moreover keep longer, and go much farther, and, which is ſtill of more Conſequence, it would afford better Nouriſhment. Upon theſe Conſiderations I have often been induced to think it very adviſeable that the Government ſhould undertake fattening their own Hogs, and that proper Conveniencies, ſhould be erected and contrived for it in the moſt proper Places. If it ſhould be urged, that the Proviſions will become dearer by theſe Means, what is that paultry Conſideration when put into the Scale againſt the Lives and Healths of ſo many brave Seamen? But for my Part I can't enter into the Reaſon why they ſhould not be as cheap at leaſt, if not cheaper; for there is a Profit to be made on the fattening which would in ſome meaſure be ſaved to the Government: Beſides, I ſhould think the damaged Biſcuit might herein turn to a better Account than by ſelling it. The Hogs when fattened upon Acorns, Beach-Maſt, *&c.* are often apt to be meaſled, and

if

if it has the leaſt Tendency that Way, the Pork is never fit for Sea-Service, and much leſs fit is it when Hogs are fattened on Greaves and Offals, and are blown up with ſuch naſty Filth which runs from moſt Brewerys and Diſtillerys, which, for the ſake of Cheapneſs, is practiſed in moſt great Towns and Cities. In ſhort, as the only true Way of having Pork fit for the Service of the Navy is by feeding the Hogs on Peas and Beans, which will always render their Fleſh hard and firm; and as the Government can never be ſo ſure of this being done as when they fat them themſelves, I ſhould think it extremely worth their while to undertake it. That Sailors drinking ſpirituous Liquors to a certain Degree is abſolutely requiſite for the Preſervation of their Healths, I am very ſenſible, but I can't think keeping a Gin-Shop aboard a Ship, to which they may have Recourſe as often as they pleaſe, is of any real Service. If the Government Allowance is not ſufficient, they ought to have a ſufficient Allowance made them;

if

if there is already ſufficient, there is no Occaſion for this Kind of Slop, which, if indulged to Exceſs, can't but tend to the Prejudice of the Sailors Health. How proper it may be on wet and cold Days, or before an Action, to indulge the Men with any greater Share than their common Allowance, the Commanders, methinks, ſhould be the beſt Judges. An extraordinary Proviſion, therefore, of the beſt Spirits ought to be laid in for this Purpoſe, on the Government's Account, and never any given out but at the Diſcretion of the Commander: The Advantages ariſing from which are, in the firſt Place, better Order aboard a Ship and a leſs Abuſe of drinking Spirits, which, probably, will be of better Quality, and conſequently leſs injurious to the Sailors Health; it will alſo be the Means of making the Sailor thrifty, which whenever the common Men ſhall experience the Sweets of, and the Advantages ariſing from it to their Families, they will ſtill be more in love with the Service. Cleanlineſs as well

as

as Ship-room contributing as much as their daily Food to the Healths and Lives of Soldiers as well as Seamen. I can't help adding a Word on that Article, for certainly nothing is more pernicious than ſtowing Men too cloſe aboard a Ship; whatever therefore may be the Expence of an additional Number of Tranſports, it ought never to be conſider'd on any important Expedition; nor ought leſs Room to be allowed, when there is the leaſt Probability of their being any time at Sea, than two Tons *per* Man; for any Saving on this Article would be a Saving to our Loſs; nay, ſuch a Saving may chance, and, probably, would be the Means of rendering any grand Deſign abortive. On the other hand, nothing contributes more to the Vigour and Preſervation of the private Men than great Cleanlineſs; and tho' I may venture to affirm, that our Captains of Ships of War in general are highly to be commended in this Reſpect, and for their great Diligence in perſonally examining into every thing which their Duty requires of them; yet as

by

by others it is often ſhamefully neglected, I think it would not be amiſs if a ſtanding Order was ſuſpended in ſome common Part of the Ship, by which every Commander ſhould be ſtrictly enjoin'd under a Penalty of forfeiting ſo much Money to the Ship's Crew, if he neglected perſonally viſiting all Parts of the Ship within ſo many Days as may be judged proper, Caſes of Sickneſs only excepted; for nothing ſooner than Filth and Naſtineſs breeds Diſeaſes and Sickneſs, which often prove infectious, terribly ſpreading itſelf from the higheſt to the loweſt. Whether *Bermudas* * Cedar might not be of great Uſe in ſheathing Ships to prevent the Worms penetrating and corroding them, I can't take upon me to affirm, but if it ſhould be found to anſwer that Purpoſe, thoſe Woods would be of ſuch infinite Advantage that the Government ought to take the greateſt Care that they ſuffer no Dilapidation. And here I muſt beg Leave to add a Word in Regard to

* There is a Wood in *Jamaica* which they call the *Bitter Wood*, but I doubt is too ſcarce and too dear at preſent to anſwer this Purpoſe.

to the Preſervation of *Engliſh* Oak, and particularly of his Majeſty's Woods; for the great and ſhameful Havock which has of late been made in his Majeſty's Foreſts, calls loudly for Redreſs; and here if it was not for carrying this little Treatiſe into too great a Length, I would gladly expatiate on an Evil of that great national Conſequence which tends to the utter Ruin and Deſtruction of the *Britiſh* Navy. That there always has been more or leſs Abuſe of this Sort committed, I am ready to allow; but when little Pilferings are grown into a Kind of Devaſtation, 'tis high Time to look out for a Remedy. Gentlemen of Fortune, who are the People generally entruſted with the Guardianſhip of theſe Woods, one would imagine would look upon their Honor as being too much at Stake, if they ſhould appear ſo negligent of their Truſt, as to ſuffer any Waſte (for I can't ſuppoſe they would be guilty of ſuch a ſcandalous Practice themſelves) to be committed in thoſe ſacred Dodonæan Groves, the Preſervation of which they have been charged

with by the Public. They would, one would alſo imagine, conſider the Good of their Country ſo much on this Occaſion, that they could not fail executing their Truſt with the greateſt Faithfulneſs. But ſuch is the Prevalence of Cuſtom and bad Example, that it makes the fouleſt and blackeſt Spot a mere inconſiderable Speck. It is plain therefore, that we can't lay ſuch People under too great Checks. And for this Reaſon, I would propoſe, that before any Fall or Cut ſhould be made in any of his Majeſty's Foreſts, either of Underwood or Timber, the ſame ſhould be ſurvey'd, mark'd and approved, not only by the Surveyor, or Deputy, (but not both) and two Juſtices of the Peace, having no Intereſt in them, but by the ſeveral Verdurers of the Foreſt, and Conſervator of the Woods, or as many of them as ſhall chance to be reſident in the County or Counties at the Time of cutting the Woods, and are capable of giving Attendance, and that each Perſon during the Time of his Attendance ſhould be allow'd at the Rate of Two Guineas

neas *per Diem*: Nor ſhould any Contract for the Sale of ſuch Wood be deem'd lawful that was not allow'd of by the Majority of thoſe preſent, due Notice having been given to each Perſon of the Time of ſurveying as well as of the Sale; and if any ſhould refuſe his Attendance (Caſes of Sickneſs excepted, or of Non Reſidence in the County) he or they ſhould be liable to a Penalty of 5*l.* payable in ſuch Manner as ſhall be thought fit. And for the better and eaſier Diſcovery of Perſons ſtealing Wood out of his Majeſty's Foreſts, I think that any Perſon or Perſons in or near the Foreſt having Wood or Timber ſuſpected to be ſtolen, he or they, Declaration being firſt made of it upon Oath, before one of his Majeſty's Juſtices, ſhould be oblig'd to prove his or their Right and Property in the ſaid Wood or Timber, which would be the Means of convicting many who at preſent rob with Impunity. By the Act of the 35th of *Henry* VIII. which was perpetuated by the 13th of *Elizabeth*, to oblige every Man in cutting Woods to leave twelve Standils, the Penalty of

3 *s.*

3 *s.* 4 *d.* only *per* Tree is infinitely too ſmall an Object, and ought, therefore, to be increaſed to 20 *s. per* Tree at leaſt, two Thirds of which ſhould be for the Benefit of the Perſon ſueing for the ſame on account of his Trouble and Expence, and one Third to his Majeſty.

LASTLY, I am of Opinion that if a Reſerve was to be made out of the ſeveral Prizes taken by our Men of War in order to raiſe a Fund for the Reward and Encouragement of ſuch of our Men of War as ſhould *in futuro* take any of the Enemy's Ships of War, to be annually diſtributed in Proportion to the Strength and Force of the Ship or Ships of the Enemy, compared with the Ship or Ships which had been ſo glorioufly victorious, I humbly conceive it may be attended with no bad Conſequence, and I am ſure it would be but common Juſtice.

I SHOULD now cloſe this Diſcourſe, but can't help once more throwing out a few Words in regard to the Advantages which

a Naval War has over a Continent War with reſpect to *England*. In the firſt Place, the Pay either of Foreign or of National Troops out of our own Dominions is ſo much Money abſolutely loſt to your Country, for of Three Millions, which it will probably coſt us this Year only, the whole, except, perhaps, 150 or 200,000*l.* *per Annum* at moſt, which, probably, we may get by an Increaſe of Trade, will be as entirely loſt to this Country as if ſunk at the Bottom of the Sea; beſides the ‡ Loſs of Hands which muſt neceſſarily be wanting to carry on Trade, is a Conſideration of no ſmall Importance. 3*dly*, The great Expence and Draught both of Men and Money muſt neceſſarily weaken your Abilities to carry on the War by Sea, where you are ſtrongeſt, with ſuch a high Hand as, probably, you would do, or at leaſt might do, if you was not engaged on the Continent. I muſt here beg Leave to explain myſelf, for I am free

‡ The Army and Navy, with the People immediately employ'd under them, at preſent amount to ſcarce leſs than 300,000 men.

free to own that if by feeding a Continent War with a little Money, that is to ſay, if at the Expence of half a Million only you could involve and ſouſe your Enemy over Head and Ears in ſuch a War, I ſhould think it good Policy ſo to do: But here is the Difficulty to obſerve that *ne plus ultra*; for when you come to engage yourſelves as deep, or deeper in it than the Enemy herſelf, what is it other than downright Madneſs? For what Nation, however rich, can poſſibly bear ſuch Outgoings? If we actually poſſeſſed 25 or 30 Millions before the Commencement of the War, how little while will even that immenſe Sum laſt at the Rate we go on? Will not the Scarcity of Money be every Year more and more ſeverely felt by the People? And what in the End will be left us of ſo many Millions to carry on the common Buſineſs of our poor impoveriſh'd and diſtreſſed Country? The only Balance which we have to place in the Scale againſt theſe Out-goings, is the clear Profit on the Balance of Trade, and what that may be the Lord knows: But muſt

not

not Trade itſelf ſoon ſicken under ſuch a heavy Load of Taxes as are daily increaſing upon us? On the other hand, whether the Queen of *Hungary* or the King of *Pruſſia* get the better of one another, what is it to us? As long as there are two Chiefs ſo near upon a Par with each other in *Germany*, *France* will be always playing one againſt the other, and will always obtain ſome Increaſe of Territory by it: Whereas if there was not to be any Prince of the Empire ſo nearly a Match for the Head of the Empire, I make no Doubt but the *French* and *Germans* would ſoon be at Variance; and as the Empire would then be able to ſtand alone againſt *France*, there would be no Pretence for engaging us in her Quarrels. I wiſh therefore, for my Part, that great and deſerving as the King of *Pruſſia* is, both as a Prince and a Heroe, and I can never ſufficiently admire his military Abilities, yet, I ſay, I could, as an *Engliſhman*, wiſh that he was to be *aut* Cæſar *aut nullus*: For by making ourſelves Principals on the Continent, and by conſtantly

ſtantly taking Part with the Weakeſt, we muſt inevitably draw Ruin on our own Heads, without the leaſt Proſpect of Advantage. As the Ocean when it ceaſes to be agitated and diſturbed by Storms and Tempeſts which come from afar is ſure to find its own Level, ſo the different Continental Powers of Europe, however jarring at preſent, will ſoon find their own proper natural Balance of Power when left to themſelves. As to the *American* Continent, if we were to furniſh our Colony People with a little Money only (for I think it clear that they could raiſe a great Part themſelves) and to ſend them all Kinds of military Stores, we need not be under any Apprehenſions of their not being able to defend themſelves; but having taſted the Sweets of War, 'tis probable that they, and more eſpecially the Frontier Patentees, whoſe Eſtates have already been doubled and trebled, will now be glad to make a trading War of it; and the Contractors, I make no Doubt, will unite to a Man in the Clamor of there being

being an abſolute Neceſſity for our taking the whole Burthen on ourſelves; notwithſtanding that at the ſame Expence we put ourſelves to in ſending *European* Forces there, they could raiſe and maintain four Times the Number of *American* ones, who are better ſkill'd in that Manner of Buſh-fighting than our own. But, good Gods! what is it that we propoſe to ourſelves in carrying on the War there at ſuch an immenſe Expence? Have we not already more Land there than we know how to cultivate; and if we had ſtill more what ſhould we do with it? As to the Peace and Quiet which our back Settlements may promiſe to themſelves, 'tis in vain to expect it as long as there are any wild *Indians* left; for Barbarians will always be barbarous, and frequent Murders and Robberies will always be heard of in uncultivated and uncivilized Countries. But ſuppoſe you could outſhoot even the moſt ſanguine Wiſhes, and oblige the *French* to entirely evacuate all *Canada*, what would you do with the preſent Inhabitants? Would you ſend them

back to *Old France*? Or would you remove them to ſome of the *French* Sugar Colonies? Or is there any Place which you could ſend them to where they would, probably, interfere leſs with the *Engliſh* Trade than they do at preſent in *Canada*? A Country which has no Communication with her Mother Country above four or five Months in the Year: A Country too ſo cold and inhoſpitable, that the People can hardly be ſaid to increaſe and multiply. In ſhort, the *French* Back Settlements can never do us much Harm, unleſs it be in regard to the Furr Trade *, which too they would probably draw leſs Benefit from if our *Hudſon's-Bay* Trade was leſs confined. A great deal more may be urged if there was Room to enter into that Diſpute, not only in regard to the preſent State of the Colonies and good Policy itſelf, but to that immenſe Tract of Land lying between the *French* and us, which neither we nor they have People to

* The whole Furr Trade doth not exceed 300,000 *l. per Annum*, of which our Share at preſent is 100,000 *l.* at leaſt.

to occupy and cultivate. 'Tis true that the Money expended there will, in a Courſe of Years, return again, but we may chance to ſtarve in the mean time; and I doubt, as it is, our lateſt Poſterity will feel the dire Effects of this War. As to ſome particular Forts, I confeſs they may be of ſome Advantage, if we could poſſeſs ourſelves of them; but, ſurely, they are not of Conſequence enough to make it worth our while to ſend an *European* Army to reduce them. I am therefore for confining ourſelves intirely to a Naval War, which will always circulate our Money within ourſelves, of which Circulation every Trade almoſt will find ſome Benefit: Nor is this inconſiſtent with any Project which ſhall be form'd by an enterpriſing Miniſter for the Conqueſt of ſome of the *French* Sugar Colonies, the Loſs of which would be irreparable to the Enemy, not only in regard to the foreign Sugar Trade, which they almoſt wholly ſupply at preſent, but alſo in reſpect to their Number of Seamen, beſides deeply wounding many Merchants in *Old France*, who at preſent

grow

grow rich by ſupplying them with every Kind of Neceſſary; add to this, that it would be no leſs Acquiſition to ourſelves, being the Thing which we moſtly want.

F I N I S.

THE Editor in Juſtice to the Author, begs Leave to aſſure the Public, that this Pamphlet, which was put into his Hands in *February*, with Leave to publiſh it, had made its Appearance much ſooner, but the Copy after having been detain'd by the Printer to whom it was at firſt ſent upwards of two Months, was at laſt obliged to be ſent to another Preſs.

POSTSCRIPT.

I Doubt that it will not be agreeable to Gentlemen of the Navy to loſe any Part of that Space aboard their Ships which they are at preſent poſſeſſed of. I cannot therefore expect their Concurrence in a Propoſal, which is to reduce their Cabins, which however, I think very neceſſary. The Hammocks of the private Men hang at preſent in a ſpace ſcarce exceeding fourteen Inches, whereas they ſhould have eighteen Inches, at leaſt, allowed them; for as I have already obſerved, nothing is of greater Prejudice to Sailors than ſtowing them too cloſe. At the ſame Time the Officers have a Space of four Feet each; how much this Diſproportion muſt diſtreſs the Crew of any Ship is but too obvious: And in three-deck Ships it is ſtill worſe; for the Air in them is far leſs pure* than in two-deck Ships.

* For this Reaſon three-deck Ships are unfit to be employ'd in hot Climates.

I would therefore adviſe, that part of the Captain's Cabin ſhould be ſpared to the inferior Officers, and that it ſhould be ſo contrived, as to be ſhip'd and unſhip'd, which, by giving more Room, would be of great Advantage to the Service. The Cordage of the Navy too, Cables excepted, ſhould be all four-ſtranded Cordage, which being leſs penetrable by the Wet, would prove more durable; and though of leſs Size, if thought fit, would be equally ſtrong with what they have at preſent. And whereas I mentioned before *Bermudas* Cedar as being a proper Wood to defend Ships againſt Worms, I have ſince been credibly informed, that they have had Experience of a Wood in *Connecticut* much fitter for this Uſe, and of which there is great Plenty. At *London-Town*, in particular, I have been aſſured, that Mr. *Mackenſie*, and others, have ſheathed their Ships with it, and have found it impenetrable to the Worm. I muſt crave Leave here to add,

that

that it would be greatly for the Public Service, if both Captains and Maſters of Men of War were to be ſtrictly enjoined, on every convenient Opportunity, to take the Soundings, not only of the Ports and Harbours, but of all the Shoals and Rocks making themſelves perfectly acquainted with the Appearances of the reſpective Land on the Coaſts of *Holland*, *France*, *Portugal*, *Spain*, &c. in order that they may be as little Strangers to any Part of the foreign Coaſt, as they are, or ought to be, of their own; which, occaſionally, might be the Means of preſerving his Majeſty's Ships from foundering on any Part of thoſe Coaſts, as well in time of Peace as War. And ſuch Captains, who made themſelves thus Maſters in the Knowledge of the Sea-Coaſts of the reſpective foreign Countries, ſhould, on all Occaſions, have the Preference of others. It ought alſo to be a Rule with the Admiralty, never to employ any Captain (whatever his Merit may be in other Reſpects) whoſe Ship re-

turned from a Voyage in bad Condition, and Men very ſickly, if there was the leaſt Reaſon to ſuſpect that it proceeded from want of Care or Cleanlineſs.

As to Docks, I have already ſaid, that there ought to be one at *Halifax*, where Nature favors it. There ſhould alſo be one in *Potowmack* River, though the Tide there ſcarce riſes high enough; and one at *Antego*, and another at *Jamaica*, where they have very little Tide, whatever may be the Expence of making them. As to *Kingſale*, on Conſideration, it ſeems to be a leſs proper Place than *Cork* for forming a Dock, not only on account of Proviſions, but on account of the Bar, which is a great Objection to *Kingſale* Harbour. And here give me Leave to obſerve, that inſtead of employing nine capital Ships off the Leeward Iſlands, which I mentioned before, I would employ twenty; nor ought a leſs Number to be ſtationed in the Downs, and the Channel, during a Time of War. There ſhould alſo be a Squadron to protect the *African* Trade.

Trade. And as it may be eaſily known by victualling Ships, *&c.* if they are deſtined for the *Eaſt-Indies*; it behoves us to have the beſt Intelligence in regard to ſuch Enemies Ships as may be deſtined for that Service, in order to ballance her Naval Strength in that Part of the World, with a ſufficient Naval Strength of our own. All which Services, with thoſe beforemention'd, would require 150 capital Ships at leaſt.*

HOWEVER, theſe Rules are not to be conſtrued in ſuch a ſtrict Senſe, as never to be varied from. It is ſufficient if they point out nearly what is proper to be done. In ſhort, wherever the Enemy ſhall have any great Squadrons, it behoves us to oppoſe them with a Superiority of Ships; and to be in a Condition of doing this, we ſhould increaſe our Navy in Proportion as the Enemy increaſes hers; ever keeping a watchful

* The Squadrons appointed to cruiſe off *Breſt* and *Toulon*, ought always to be provided with ſix Months ſpare Proviſions. And all great Squadrons ſhould be furniſh'd with a ſufficient Number of Fireſhips; and all little Squadrons ſhould have a proper Number of light Sloops attending them, which ſhould keep a conſtant Look out to prevent their being ſurpriſed by a ſuperior Force.

ful Eye over her. For ſhe is, undoubtedly, our moſt dangerous Rival, in regard to her Naval Power, which, if not timely check'd, may chance to prove, ſooner or later, the Ruin of our Own; and, conſequently, the Ruin of this Country.

On the Continent ſhe is already ſo great, that there is ſcarce any other Power of *Europe* a Match for her; but, happily for us, ſhe is ſtill weak at Sea, and perhaps it is the only weak Part of her Government. Let us not then ſlip this glorious Opportunity of purſuing our Blow; but let us exert ourſelves, till our Enemy has no Footing left in any Part of the *American* Iſlands. For the true Policy of *England* is, if poſſible, to prevent *France* from becoming a great Naval Power, by cruſhing her before ſhe grows too ſtrong, which can only be effected by making War on her Iſlands*, in which, if we

* If we could diſpoſſeſs the *French* of St. *Domingo*, I ſhould think it worth While to give *Spain* one Million and

we ſhould have the good Fortune to ſucceed, as they are the Foundation of her preſent great Navy, at leaſt as it ſtood before the Commencement of the War, they will infallibly ſecure to us, and our Poſterity, a Superiority at Sea, leaving us nothing to fear from *France*, of whoſe ambitious Views we ſhould otherwiſe have every Thing to apprehend; it being a Maxim with her that *defends*

a Half, or two Millions (which might eaſily be raiſed by the Sale of Lands to our own People, or an eaſy Tax) to make us a Ceſſion of her Moiety of that Country; nay, it may be worth While to conquer it, even for the *Spaniard*, provided that the *French* were to be totally excluded. Either of which Propoſals, one would imagine, might induce the *Spaniard* to conſent to our obliging the *French* to evacuate that Country. But though neither of theſe Overtures ſhould be liſtened to by the Court of *Spain*, that ought not to hinder us ſending an Army into *French Hiſpaniola*, where, if the *Spaniard* thought fit to give the Enemy Protection, we ought to look on ſuch a Step as a Declaration of *Spain* in favor of *France*; and if we did right, we ſhould treat it as ſuch. In the mean Time the Troops tranſported there, ſhould conſiſt of ſuch a Number as would be ſufficient to reduce the whole Iſland, in caſe the *Spaniard* thought fit to give the Enemy Aſſiſtance. But if we were only to over-run the Country, carry away the Slaves, and deſtroy the Works, they would not recover it again, perhaps, in Half a Century.

delenda eſt Carthago. But further, by a Reduction of the Enemy's Iſlands, we may hope to ſee the Ballance of Power in *Europe* eſtabliſhed on a firm and ſolid Baſis, which is never to be brought about by any other Means; for, as to any other Schemes of effecting it, Experience has ſufficiently convinced us that they are mere Cobwebs, inſecure, like the Cords of the *Philiſtines*, and much too weak to be of any Reſiſtance. For ſuch is the Enemy we have to deal with, that whatever Neceſſity may oblige her to part with on the Continent one Day, ſhe is almoſt certain of recovering it the next. But the loſs of her Iſlands ſhe can never hope to redreſs: And the loſs of them muſt neceſſarily be attended with the loſs of her Naval Power, her Trade, and her Riches, which alone enables her to diſturb the Peace and Tranquillity of *Europe.* Let us view now the Conqueſt of the *French* Iſlands in the Light of an Acquiſition to this Country, and the Advantages which preſent themſelves

ſelves are immenſe, both in Regard to Trade, and the Increaſe of our Naval Power. Our foreign Sugar Trade will be once more in a flouriſhing Condition: Our Fiſhing Trade will again extend itſelf; and, becoming greater than it ever has been, the Conſumption of the Inhabitants, who would be glad to live under *Britiſh* Government, will increaſe the Demand of every *Britiſh* Manufacture, and in conſequence will be the Means of ſupporting a greater Number of Sailors. In ſhort, every Conſideration of Honor and Glory, Self-Preſervation, Prudence and Intereſt, encoucourages, animates, and incites us not to lay down our Arms till we have reduced the Enemy ſo low that ſhe can't riſe again to hurt us. Nay, the very Juncture promiſes Succeſs; for it happens at a Time when all *Europe* united is not ſtrong enough to ward off the Blow which we may now give to the Naval Power of *France*. But, good Gods! the Buſineſs is more than half done already; and the Continuance of the War another Year only, will probably ſecure to us all that we can wiſh. Not to avail our-

ſelves then of the preſent Opportunity, would be downright Madneſs. It would be acting like *Hannibal*, who knew how to conquer, but never knew how to make Uſe of Victory. And I wiſh the ſame unhappy Fate might not attend us which befell the *Carthaginian* State, who after having it in their Power to ruin the *Romans*, were at laſt ruin'd themſelves. I hope that I need not exhort Gentlemen who have been the Authors of our late proſperous Meaſures, not to loſe the Advantages which they have already gain'd: They can't but be ſenſible that

Non minor eſt Virtus quam quærere parta tueri;

and I make no Doubt but they will go on with the ſame Spirit as they have begun. As to the Electorate, if that Country ſhould fall a Sacrifice to the Enemy, I would propoſe giving his Majeſty *Guadalupe* * in Exchange,

* One would imagine that the glorious Acquiſition of *Guadalupe*, and Advantages ariſing from it, were not underſtood, by the little Notice taken of that moſt important and invaluable Conqueſt. For my Part, I can't help looking on ſuch unaccountable Silence as an ill Omen.

change, where his People would have much richer Lands, and not ſo liable to be laid waſte (being ſecured by our Fleet) than they have at preſent in *Hanover*; in which Caſe too we ſhould only have a Naval War to conduct, and under a Naval War alone, properly managed, this Country could not fail to thrive and proſper. I hope therefore that we ſhall never give up (except on the laſt Neceſſity) any of the Places which we have already taken, or hereafter may take.

But, if at the End of the War, it ſhould become a Meaſure of the Miniſtry to reſtore to the Enemy* all that we have taken from her, except a few Forts in *America*, or even *Quebec* ‡ itſelf, what will be the Conſequence? This War has

 already

* If we are not reſolved on keeping *Louiſbourg*, would it not be better to deſtroy its Fortifications? The many Towns which the *French* diſmantled in the late War may ſerve to juſtify any ſuch Proceeding.

‡ The Importance of *Quebec* may be judged of by the Number of Ships which that Trade employs, which ſcarce exceeds ſix Ships in the Year; whereas the Trade of the Enemy's Iſlands is immenſe. As to Scalping, It has been an old Cuſtom of the ſavage Indians, and I doubt will continue to be practiſed as long as they remain uncivilized.

already brought us to be near One Hundred Millions in Debt; another War muſt prove our inevitable Ruin; and as ſoon as *France* has had Time to recover Breath, we may aſſure ourſelves that ſhe will not fail breaking the Peace. Have we not had Experience enough of *French* Faith, to be certain of this? And are we for ever to contend with the Enemy without availing ourſelves of the Advantages which we have gained, till Fortune turns in her Favour? In what a ridiculous Light ſhould we not appear in that Caſe, being obliged to ſue for Peace of an inveterate and unrelenting Foe, after having let ſlip ſo many favourable Opportunitys of preventing ſuch a fatal Cataſtrophe? But if it was only to reimburſe ourſelves the immenſe Expence which we have been obliged to ſuſtain, in Defence of our juſt Rights, it would be the higheſt Folly in us not to keep Poſſeſſion of the Enemy's Iſlands, to which our victorious Arms have given us ſo fair a Title.

As to the Loſs of *Minorca*, it doth not appear ſo conſiderable as to induce us to give

give up any Part of our Conqueſts in Conſideration of it. Witneſs the Inſurances of Merchant Ships into the *Mediterranean*. Whilſt we have a Superiority at Sea, we can do without it. In the mean time, if we ſhould ever loſe that Superiority, the Enemy will at any Time command it. I am, nevertheleſs, far from thinking that it is of no Conſequence: All I mean is, that we ſhould part with nothing in Exchange which may contribute to give the Enemy that Superiority, and which is the only Thing that ought to be attended to in making Peace.

FINIS.

The Author in a former Treatiſe on the ſame Subject having aſſerted, on Memory, that by the *Nicæan* Treaty the *Lacedæmonians* conſented to ſail in Merchant Ships only, which he had read ſomewhere, he finds, looking into the beſt Writers, that they agreed only to deliver up their Ships on the Coaſt where the Naval Engagement happen'd.

ERRATA.

Page 6. *instead of* these Robberies, *read* the Robberies complain'd of as having been committed on the High Seas. Beleive *r.* believe.——Page 7. *after the Words* carried in Time of Peace, *add*, beyond which neutral Powers have no Right of extending their carrying Trade.——Page 10. in Effect than, *r.* other than.——Page 11. Firmness and national, *r.* firm national.——Page 14. sometimes happens, *r.* may happen.——Page 22. Seniority must, *r.* Seniority-ship.——Page 26. on their, *r.* in.——Page 34. Spot a meer, *r.* appear a, *&c.*——Page 41. *after the Words* what should we do with it? *add*, Let it too be consider'd how few of the Men sent to *North America* will ever find their Way back to their Mother Country.